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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Zulieferer sehen sich immer wieder mit Kunden konfrontiert, die aufgrund von Konzentrati-
onsprozessen in ihrer Branche über Käufermacht verfügen. Die Ausübung von Käufermacht 
wird oft als negativ für die Innovationstätigkeit von Zulieferern betrachtet, da angenommen 
wird, dass sie zu niedrigeren Gewinnen bei den Zulieferern und mithin auch zu niedrigeren 
Investitionsanreizen führt. 
Allerdings können Käufermacht und die damit einhergehenden Wettbewerbsverhältnisse im 
Käufermarkt die Innovationsanreize des Zulieferers durchaus erhöhen. Wir betrachten sowohl 
die Preis- als auch die Technologiedimension des Käufermarktwettbewerbs. Firmen, die in 
intensivem Preiswettbewerb stehen, können ihre Verhandlungsmacht gegenüber Zulieferern 
dazu nutzen, Kostensenkungen (durch Prozessinnovationen) oder Qualitätsverbesserungen 
(durch Produktinnovationen) zu fordern, um sich selbst im eigenen Markt von ihren Wettbe-
werbern absetzen zu können. Zulieferer, deren Kunden in starkem Technologiewettbewerb 
stehen, müssen notwendigerweise innovativ sein und Wissenstransfer vom Kunden sicherstel-
len. In beiden Fällen sind Käufer und Zulieferer auf Kooperation und Kollaboration angewie-
sen, die erhebliche Investitionen verursachen. Dies wiederum stärkt die Verhandlungsposition 
des Zulieferers und erhöht damit auch seine Innovationsanreize. 
Bislang haben sich allerdings erst wenige empirische Untersuchen dem Zusammenhang zwi-
schen Käufermacht und Innovationsanreizen des Zulieferers gewidmet. Die vorliegenden Ar-
beiten finden regelmäßig einen negativen Effekt, verwenden jedoch keine objektiven Maße 
bzw. lediglich Maße auf Branchenebene, um Käufermacht abzubilden. Darüber hinaus sind 
sie auf Branchen beschränkt, die als besonders stark von Käufermacht betroffen gelten, ohne 
dabei die Wettbewerbsverhältnisse im Käufermarkt zu berücksichtigen. 
Wir überprüfen empirisch den Effekt von Käufermacht auf die Innovationsanreize der Zulie-
ferer sowohl in Bezug auf die Entscheidung, in Innovationen zu investieren, als auch auf die 
Höhe dieser Investitionen. Dazu verwenden wir Unternehmensdaten des Mannheimer Innova-
tionspanels (MIP). Unser Datensatz umfasst 1.129 Unternehmen aus Deutschland aus dem 
verarbeitenden Gewerbe und dem Dienstleistungssektor. Er enthält Angaben zum Anteil der 
drei größten Kunden am Umsatz des Zulieferers sowie zu den Möglichkeiten der Kunden zu 
konkurrierenden Zulieferern zu wechseln, sodass das Ausmaß von Käufermacht objektiv auf 
Unternehmensebene abgebildet werden kann. 
Wir zeigen, dass Käufermacht einen negativen Effekt auf die Innovationsentscheidung eines 
Zulieferers hat. Dieser negative Effekt wird jedoch abgemildert, wenn sich ein Zulieferer mit 
Kunden konfrontiert sieht, die ihrerseits in starkem Preiswettbewerb stehen und über Käufer-
macht gegenüber dem Zulieferer verfügen. Wir finden keine Hinweise darauf, dass Käufer-
macht einen direkten Einfluss auf die Entscheidung eines Zulieferers hat, wie intensiv in In-
novationsaktivitäten investiert wird. Stattdessen finden wir, dass der Effekt von Käufermacht 
auf die Innovationsintensität des Zulieferers von Grad des technologischen Wettbewerbs im 
Käufermarkt abhängt. Je stärker dieser Wettbewerb ist, desto niedriger sind die FuE- Invest-
ments eines Zulieferers, der sich einem Kunden mit Käufermacht gegenüber sieht. 
Non-technical summary 
With many industries experiencing significant concentration processes during the last years, 
suppliers are increasingly confronted with powerful buyers. The common belief is that exer-
tion of buyer power negatively affects the innovation decisions of suppliers. The rationale 
behind this view is that buyer power leads to decreasing profits of suppliers, which at the 
same time lowers their investment incentives. 
This explanation may be too narrow as competition in the buyer market may spur suppliers' 
innovation incentives. We consider both the price and the technology dimension of buyer 
market competition. A powerful buyer confronted with strong price competition might have 
the incentive to demand lower prices or higher quality in order to gain a cost advantage or to 
differentiate away from competitors. Moreover, for suppliers exposed to powerful technologi-
cally competing buyers it may be a precondition to be innovative and to utilize knowledge 
spillovers from the buyer side. Then supplier and buyer need cooperation and collaboration 
which requires considerable investments into their relationship. In turn this leads to a stronger 
bargaining position for the supplier and thus increases innovation incentives. 
A few empirical studies are dedicated to the analysis of buyer power and suppliers' incentives 
to innovate and they frequently find a negative relationship. However these studies lack an 
objective measure for buyer power or merely use industry measures. Furthermore the focus is 
by now on particular industries which are perceived to be heavily affected by concentration 
processes among buyers. Besides, all these studies tend to neglect the dimensions of competi-
tion in the buyer market. 
We analyse the relationship between buyer power and suppliers' innovation incentives empir-
ically in different stages of the innovation process. That includes the innovation decision and 
the decision on the intensity of innovation activity. We apply firm level data provided by the 
Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP). Our dataset comprises 1,129 observations from German 
firms across manufacturing and service sectors and allows us to apply objective measures for 
buyer power taking account of a supplier’s economic dependency from the largest three cus-
tomers and the buyers’ opportunities to switch to competing suppliers. 
We find a negative effect of buyer power on a supplier’s likelihood to invest in R&D. This 
negative effect is mitigated by the intensity of price competition in the downstream market. In 
contrast, we find no evidence of buyer power to affect a supplier’s decision how much to in-
vest in R&D directly. Instead, there is weak evidence that the effect of buyer power depends 
on the intensity of technology competition in the downstream market. The stronger the tech-
nology competition downstream, the lower R&D investments of a supplier confronted with a 
powerful buyer. 
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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of market structures on innovation activities has received much attention in inno-
vation research. The vast majority of the literature concentrates on the effects of horizontal 
competition on innovation incentives and neglects the incentives resulting from vertical inter-
actions in markets. With many industries experiencing concentration processes suppliers are 
often confronted with powerful buyers. Yet, relatively little is known about how powerful 
buyers may affect innovation incentives of upstream firms. A common belief is that exertion 
of buyer power negatively affects innovation decision of suppliers because buyer power will 
lead to decreasing profits of suppliers, which at the same time lowers their investment incen-
tives. This is expected to reduce the variety in suppliers' range of products (OECD, 1998; 
European Commission, 1999; Inderst and Shaffer, 2007). However, recent theoretical findings 
suggest that buyer power might have positive impacts on the suppliers' innovation incentives 
(Inderst and Wey, 2007; Inderst and Wey, 2011). 
So far, the role of suppliers' innovation incentives in the presence of powerful buyers has been 
discussed largely from a theoretical perspective.1 From an empirical point of view, only a few 
studies exist that analyse suppliers' incentives to innovate when facing a powerful buyer. 
These studies often lack an objective measure for buyer power on firm level but rather use 
either aggregated industry measures or firms' subjective assessment whether they are con-
fronted with powerful buyers. Furthermore, analyses of the relationship between buyer power 
and suppliers' incentives to innovate are mostly focused on particular industries which are 
perceived to be heavily affected by concentration processes among buyers. Besides, all these 
studies tend to neglect the dimensions of competition in buyer markets. 
We argue that it does make a difference for the upstream firm whether it is supplying to a 
buyer engaged in intensive competition or to a buyer facing no or only low level competition. 
We consider both the price and the technology dimension of competition in the downstream 
market. A powerful buyer confronted with strong price competition might have the incentive 
to align innovation activities along the value chain in order to gain a cost advantage or to dif-
ferentiate away from competitors. Moreover, it may be a precondition to be innovative and to 
utilise knowledge spillovers from the buyer side for firms supplying to powerful buyers which 
are exposed to intensive technological competition. What is more, fierce technological com-
petition in the buyer market may generate new technological opportunities for suppliers to 
invest in own R&D activities. As a consequence competition in the buyer market may lead to 
increased innovation incentives on the supply side.  
We test these hypotheses empirically with a dataset that contains 1,129 observations from 
German firms across manufacturing and service sectors based on the German Innovation Sur-
vey. In contrast to existing studies the dataset enables us to apply an objective measure for 
buyer power which takes account of a supplier’s economic dependency from the largest three 
customers and the buyers’ opportunities to switch to competing suppliers. We decompose the 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive review of the theoretical development on buyer power see e. g. Inderst and Mazzarotto 
(2008). 
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effects of buyer power on the suppliers' innovation incentives into the effect on the decision to 
start innovation activities and the effect on the amount of resources spent on innovation. 
Our results show that buyer power shapes a supplier’s innovation incentives. In addition, the 
type of competition in downstream markets matters but it affects supplier’s innovation deci-
sion at different stages differently. We find a negative effect of buyer power on a supplier’s 
likelihood to invest in R&D. This negative effect is mitigated by the intensity of price compe-
tition in the downstream market. Our finding implies that a supplier confronted with buyer 
power has a higher likelihood to start R&D activities, if price competition in the buyer market 
is strong. In contrast, we find no evidence of buyer power to affect a supplier’s decision how 
much to invest in R&D directly. Instead, there is weak evidence that the effect of buyer power 
depends on the intensity of technology competition in the downstream market. The stronger 
the technology competition downstream, the lower R&D investments of a supplier confronted 
with a powerful buyer. Our interpretation of this result is that for firms supplying to highly 
competitive industries in terms of technology, it is a precondition to have R&D activities but 
it seems that at the same time suppliers are not able to improve their bargaining position with 
further investments into a supplier-buyer relationship. Hence, powerful buyers are able to 
extract a larger share of joint profits which reduces suppliers innovation incentives compared 
to independent suppliers. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature on the effects of buyer power on suppliers' innovation incentives and 
explores the possible effects of the type of competition prevailing in the buyer market. Section 
3 presents the data, the variable specification and our estimation strategy. Descriptive statis-
tics as well as estimation results are presented in section 0. Section 5 provides a discussion of 
the results while section 6 concludes and offers further directions of research. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Buyer power and innovation incentives 
Literature provides different approaches to the emergence and impacts of buyer power. In 
contract theory it is assumed that supplier and buyer negotiate bilaterally over prices and 
quantities of the respective good or service to be traded. Given that contracting between the 
supplier and the buyer leads to joint profit, the split of the profit then depends on the bargain-
ing position of each contracting party. The strength of the bargaining position and hence bar-
gaining power is determined by the profits to be realised when the contract is made with an 
alternative supplier or buyer. The higher such outside-option payoffs in relation to the coun-
terparts outside-option payoffs the stronger the bargaining position of the respective contrac-
tor. According to this approach, buyer power results from the fact that more valuable outside 
options are at the disposal of the buyer thereby allowing the buyer to extract a larger share of 
joint profits (Inderst and Valletti, 2007; Dobson and Inderst, 2008). In this paper we adopt the 
view of buyer power being a consequence of bargaining power exerted by the downstream 
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firm (buyer) on the upstream firm (supplier) (Dobson and Inderst, 2008; Inderst and 
Mazzarotto, 2008).2 
When deciding on investment in innovation efforts a supplier will consider the discounted 
value of future rents collectable from this activity and whether these rents are appropriable. 
Given that buyer power results from a stronger bargaining position of the buyer relative to the 
supplier, the effect of buyer power on suppliers' innovation incentives seems to be clear-cut: 
When facing powerful buyers, the supplier has less incentive to innovate, as the appropriabil-
ity of innovation rents is too low. Recent theoretical studies show, however, that buyer power 
may provide additional innovation incentives for suppliers. Suppliers facing large buyers have 
an incentive to invest in both product and process innovations, given that size is the sole 
source of buyer power (Inderst and Wey, 2007). While process innovation allows lower unit 
costs at high volumes compared to a supplier facing many smaller buyers, product innovation 
renders higher revenues compared to the old product. Either way, supplier innovation leads to 
a devaluation of the buyer's outside options and in turn strengthens the bargaining position of 
the supplier allowing for a larger share of joint profits. 
Given the life-cycle hypothesis of Utterback and Abernathy (1975), a positive effect of buyer 
power on suppliers' innovation incentives might also occur since suppliers with few buyers 
may suffer less from uncertainty over innovation demand of buyers and therefore have a de-
clined risk of innovation failure (Klepper, 1996). In addition, a larger size of orders might 
induce higher incentives for suppliers to engage in R&D as there is more certainty in the sales 
of new products (Peters, 2000). 
In contrast, merger in buyer markets may reduce incentives for product differentiation by 
suppliers. Product differentiation is often linked to innovation since entering new product 
markets typically constitutes an innovation activity. In case of a buyer merger, the consolidat-
ed buyer may be better off using a single sourcing strategy, i.e. to stock only goods of one 
supplier. If the likelihood of a buyer merger is increasing, this strategy will lead to a lower 
degree of product differentiation of suppliers (Inderst and Shaffer, 2007). Large buyers may 
have an incentive to force their suppliers into contracts which constitute an exclusive relation-
ship between supplier and buyer. Such supply contracts will reduce upstream innovation be-
cause suppliers will bear disadvantages of low-scale production and have less incentive to 
innovate (Stefanadis, 1997). What is more, larger buyers can more credible threat to integrate 
backwards (Katz, 1987; Inderst and Wey, 2007) and may intensify competition on supplier 
markets. By breaking up collusion among suppliers they lower suppliers' profits (Scherer and 
Ross, 1990). This effect is increasing in the size of the buyer (Snyder, 1996; Snyder, 1998). 
Also, they are in a position to alleviate market entries on the supply side, e.g. by overtaking 
fix costs of otherwise unprofitable entrants or pre-committing some of their purchases 
(Dobson and Inderst, 2008). 
The concern about negative effects of buyer power on innovation incentives of suppliers led 
the UK Competition Commission (CC) to conduct a market investigation focusing on adverse 
                                                 
2 One could also study buyer power in the framework of monopsonistic behaviour (see e. g. Mas-Colell et al., 
1995). The main argument of this approach is that monopsonistic firms strategically reduce demand in order to 
maximise profits. However, this may not apply for most supplier-buyer relationships. 
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effects on competition in the supply for groceries in the UK due to the behaviour of retailers. 
One part of the investigation examined whether buyer power of retailers may "impose exces-
sive risks and unexpected costs on suppliers, which reduces suppliers' incentive or ability to 
invest and innovate. This could lead to reduced capacity, reduced product quality and fewer 
new product offerings" (Competition Commission, 2008, p. 157). Although the CC did not 
find evidence that UK grocery suppliers exhibit less innovation efforts, they expect the inno-
vation performance to be decreasing in future if consequences of buyer power, e.g. retrospec-
tive price adjustments or excessive transfer of risks, continue at the observed level 
(Competition Commission, 2008, p. 173). 
Empirical studies frequently find a negative relationship between buyer power and innovation 
activities of suppliers. These existing studies follow quite different approaches to capture 
buyer power and innovation incentives of suppliers. Farber (1981) analysed the effect of mar-
ket structure in the buyer market on R&D efforts in supplier industries using cross-sectional 
industry level data of 50 4-digit manufacturing SIC-industries from the US. Market structure 
in both supplier and buyer markets is measured by concentration ratios, reflecting the share of 
industries sales generated by its four largest enterprises. Employing a simultaneous equation 
model explaining the share of scientist and engineers in the workforce, the advertising intensi-
ty and the seller concentration rate, he finds evidence that concentration in the buyer market 
affects R&D incentives of suppliers. However, the sign of this effect depends on the concen-
tration in the supplier market. If the supplying industry is weakly concentrated, an increase in 
concentration of the buyer industry will have a negative effect on the share of scientists and 
engineers in the workforce. Conversely, this effect is positive if the market concentration in 
the supplier industry is sufficiently high. 
This findings are in line with the results of Peters (2000) who investigates the effect of market 
structure in the buyer market both on suppliers' innovation inputs and innovation outputs us-
ing firm-level data consisting of 401 German automotive suppliers. Innovation inputs are 
measured by R&D expenditure divided by sales as well as by total innovation expenditure 
divided by sales.3 Innovation output is captured by the introduction of product or process in-
novations within a two year span. Market structure in the buyer industry is represented by 
industry's concentration ratio (CR3) and by an additional dummy variable indicating whether 
the supplier has 10 or more customers. Regarding innovation intensity, the result indicates 
that firms supplying highly concentrated buyer industries exhibit lower levels of innovation 
intensity. The negative correlation is mitigated, however, if suppliers are operating in a con-
centrated industry. With respect to R&D intensity, market structure in the buyer industry is 
found to moderate the effect of market structure in the supplier industry. Suppliers operating 
in a concentrated industry and supplying highly concentrated buyer industries exhibit a signif-
icantly higher R&D intensity. Conversely, suppliers operating in a concentrated industry and 
supplying buyer industries with a low degree of concentration show significantly lower R&D 
intensities. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the market structure of buyer industries has 
a significant impact on the supplier's probability to introduce new products. Also, the suppli-
                                                 
3 Innovation expenditure includes expenses not only for R&D but also for other activities aiming at the introduc-
tion of new products or processes, such as design, marketing, training and purchase of machinery, equipment, 
software and intellectual property. 
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er's probability to introduce process innovations is not affected by the concentration in the 
buyers industry but by the number of customers. 
Weiss and Wittkopp (2003a; 2003b) use survey data from German food manufacturers. Inno-
vative activity is measured by the overall number of new products introduced within a three 
year time span (Weiss and Wittkopp, 2003b) and by the number of new products with either 
regular or superior quality introduced within a three year time span (Weiss and Wittkopp, 
2003a). Market power of the retailers is captured by firms' assessment whether retailers are 
able to exert pricing pressure on them on a scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). 
Using a small sample of 88 and 87 firms, respectively, they observe that suppliers experienc-
ing very high pricing pressure of retailers introduce significantly less new products. With re-
spect to quality differences among the newly introduced products they yield mixed results. 
While they observe a negative relationship between retailers' pricing pressure and the number 
of new products with regular quality, retailers' pricing pressure does not have a significant 
effect on the number of new products with premium quality. 
2.2. The role of downstream competition 
So far, researchers rarely looked at the type of competition in the buyer market when analys-
ing the relationship between buyer power and suppliers’ innovation incentives. We argue that 
it is important to take the competitive environment of the buyer into account because it is like-
ly to be transferred by a powerful buyer to the upstream market. We will distinguish between 
a price and a technology dimension of competition. Let us first consider the price dimension 
of competition. If price competition in the downstream market is strong, margins are low. 
Then a powerful buyer may squeeze suppliers' profit margins to gain competitive advantages 
over competitors. Supplying firms need to supply a higher quality (a higher quantity) to the 
same price or conversely, the same quality (the same quantity) to a lower price. In result the 
magnitude of expected innovation rents may be too small to induce R&D investments on the 
suppliers' side, especially against the background of a high failure risk and the financial bur-
den attached to an innovation project. In contrast to this traditional argument which is brought 
forward frequently (OECD, 1998; Competition Commission, 2008), suppliers can strengthen 
their bargaining position relative to the buyer by realising lower unit costs at high volumes 
(Inderst and Wey, 2007). This increases process innovation incentives for suppliers as outside 
options of the buyer are devaluated and suppliers can appropriate a higher share of innovation 
returns. 
If price competition in the downstream market is strong, buyers may aim to increase their 
margins by differentiating away from each other. This would also decrease price competition. 
In this case buyers may use their power to stimulate suppliers' product innovation activities in 
order to align innovation activities along the value chain. However, investments in R&D on 
the supplier side may be necessary to make use of the buyer's innovation impulses since 
knowledge acquired from the buyer has to be integrated in the supplier's knowledge stock 
before it can be commercially exploited. The effect of suppliers' in-house R&D may hence be 
twofold: to generate new knowledge and to create absorptive capacity which allows evalua-
tion and exploitation of externally available knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). This 
knowledge exchange will likely result in the building of co-specialised assets (Teece, 1986). 
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Such a situation obviously increases innovation incentives on the supply side as the supplier's 
bargaining position relative to the buyer improves and allows a more favourable split of the 
joint profit. Suppliers' innovation incentives may be even further spurred if specific demands 
of powerful buyers are anticipatory for larger market segments in the future (von Hippel, 
1988). Hence, suppliers exposed to buyer power and strong price competition in the down-
stream market have higher innovation incentives than suppliers with powerful buyers that are 
less exposed to price competition. We derive our first hypothesis accordingly: 
Hypothesis 1: Buyer power will have a more positive effect on suppliers' innovation incen-
tives the stronger the price competition in the buyer market. 
Another dimension of competition in the buyer market is technology intensity which is likely 
to be transferred to the supplier market as well. Intense technology competition urges buyers 
to invest heavily into the development of new products and new process technology, which 
reduces their profits. In the context of patent races, some part of this investment may not be 
turned into commercial success but is sunk, hurting profits further (Fudenberg et al., 1983). 
Buyers with bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers may use this power to shift a signifi-
cant share of these costs and risks to their suppliers. In order to maintain commercial relations 
with buyers, suppliers will have to invest into own R&D efforts along the innovation activities 
of their buyers. Consequently, suppliers' innovation incentives are higher than in a situation 
with low technology intensity in the downstream market. In fact, many studies found buyers 
are a main source for technological advance in upstream firms (Klevorick et al., 1995). 
Technology competition in the buyer market can also be seen as technological opportunity for 
suppliers. The higher R&D investments carried out in the buyer market, the more demand 
there is also for innovative upstream products (Scherer, 1982). This leads us to our second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Buyer power will have a more positive effect on suppliers' innovation incen-
tives the stronger the technological competition in the buyer market. 
3. Empirical study 
3.1. Data 
The empirical part of our study employs firm level information from the Mannheim Innova-
tion Panel (MIP) which consists of a representative stratified random sample of German 
firms. Data collection is carried out by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) 
on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The MIP has provided annual 
information on innovative behaviour in the German manufacturing sector since 1992 and in 
the service sector since 1994 and is at the same time the German contribution to the European 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Definitions of innovation and innovative activities are 
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taken from the OECD’s Oslo Manual. The target population of the MIP is enterprises located 
in Germany with at least five employees.4  
The 2005 survey wave of the MIP offers unique information on firms' market environment 
which is merged with data from the 2006 survey wave to observe innovation behaviour of 
firms in the following period. Since we are interested in the interaction between upstream and 
downstream firms, we drop all observations of firms indicating that private households or 
public institutions are the largest customers. Additionally we exclude all firms reporting that 
R&D expenditure exceeds their sales to avoid outlier problems. This leaves us with a sample 
of 1,137 observations for which information on all model variables is available. 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Innovation incentives 
A number of authors have proposed different concepts for measuring innovation activities.5 
Since we are interested in innovation incentives we choose an input measure as a proxy for 
the innovation incentives of suppliers, as it represents discounted future rents attached to in-
novative efforts no matter whether these efforts are successful. We use the R&D intensity 
which is defined as the expenditure on R&D activities divided by sales. It is widely used as 
measure of innovation input in the literature (see e. g. Cohen and Levin, 1989; Crepon et al., 
1998). 
3.2.2. Buyer power 
Our main explanatory variable of interest is buyer power.6 As we define buyer power to result 
from a relatively stronger bargaining position of the buyer compared to the supplier, we have 
to construct a measure which captures whether a supplier is confronted with buyer power or 
not. One of the factors determining a supplier’s bargaining position is the share of sales gen-
erated by one buyer, as this measure can indicate substantial economic dependency. Once, "a 
buyer accounts for sufficiently large fraction of a supplier's overall business, this may lead to 
a more-than-proportional reduction in the value of the supplier's profits outside a relationship 
with the particular buyer" (Dobson and Inderst, 2008, p. 339). This is due to the fact that in 
case the supplier loses the contract with the buyer, the supplier's economic viability could be 
undermined. Losing a large contract will result in free capacity on the supplier's side and will 
require the supplier to significantly lower prices in order to sell the excessive capacity to re-
maining buyers (Inderst and Wey, 2007). Therefore, our measure will include the extent to 
which a supplier's sales depend on its three largest customers. 
The degree to which a supplier is confronted with buyer power also depends on the buyer’s 
opportunities to switch to another supplier. The ease of such a switch is determined by the 
market structure in the supply market on the one hand and the substitutability of the demand-
ed product on the other. A monopoly in the supply market does not allow for an outside op-
                                                 
4 For a more detailed description of the MIP see Peters (2008). 
5 For an overview see Haagedorn and Cloodt (2003). 
6 For an overview of all applied variable definitions see Appendix A. 
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tion of the buyer, resulting in a powerful bargaining position of the supplier, even if the buyer 
is a monopsonist.7 Conversely, a polypolistic supply market and a monopsonistic buyer mar-
ket enable the buyer to behave opportunistically and might lead to hold-up. That is, after the 
supplier carried out necessary investments to fulfil contracted obligations, the buyer may ini-
tiate ex-post negotiations and force the supplier to accept conditions which reduce profit mar-
gins or even lead to loss (Williamson, 1975). Thus, our measure has to include information 
about the concentration in the supplier's market and the substitutability of the supplied prod-
ucts. 
Table 1: Definitions of buyer power measures 
Measure of 
buyer power 
Share of sales generated with the 
three largest customers 
Number of a supplier’s 
competitors 
Degree of substitutability of a 
supplier’s product 
BP1 ≥50%    
BP2 ≥50% >5 OR 
High substitutability (agree, 
fully agree) 
 
We consider different degrees of buyer power and subsequently define two measures (see 
Table 1) using information on the share of sales generated with the three largest customers, on 
the number of competitors in the suppliers’ main market and whether the suppliers’ main 
product is easy to substitute by competitor products. Our first measure for being exposed to 
buyer power BP1 is a dummy variable reflecting the fact that the three largest customers of a 
supplier account for 50 or more percent of the sales. We interpret this as a degree of depend-
ency from buyers which could seriously undermine the economic viability of a supplying 
firm.8 Hence it is included in all measures of a supplier’s exposure to buyer power. Our se-
cond measure BP2 equals BP1 but takes the value one only, if additionally the supplier has 
either more than 5 competitors or its products are easy to substitute. Compared to BP1, this 
definition reflects a weaker bargaining position of the supplier since it not only covers eco-
nomic dependency in terms of sales but also a buyer’s opportunities to switch to other suppli-
ers. 
3.2.3. Dimensions of competition in the buyer market 
To derive measures for the intensity of price and technology competition in the buyer market, 
it is desirable to have information about the identity of the most important buyers. Such data 
is extremely difficult to obtain through voluntary surveys since most firms will refrain from 
                                                 
7 Such circumstances, characterized by highly concentrated markets on both sides, have been described as a 
countervailing power situation by Galbraith (1956). 
8 One might object that this measure is not providing a sufficiently accurate degree of economic dependency, as 
the share of sales generated by the largest single customer could be considerably lower. However, in the merger 
case Rewe/Meinl, the European Commission established that a supplier whose business with the two merging 
chains accounted for more than 22 percent has to be considered as "economically dependent" on them. A survey 
among grocery producers provided evidence that this was the most suppliers could afford to lose without a seri-
ous danger of bankruptcy. With respect to our measure of buyer power, the smallest possible share of sales gen-
erated by one customer is roughly 17 percent, given that a supplier indicates he is economically dependent on his 
three largest customers. Hence, we consider our measure to be sufficiently precise in order to correctly reflect 
serious economic dependency from buyers. 
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disclosing such information, and sometimes confidentiality agreements with buyers restrict 
disclosure at all. In the MIP 2005 survey, firms were asked to name the sector of their three 
largest customers. Questionnaire instructions helped firms to provide buyer sector information 
that corresponds to 3-digit level of Nace9, though firms did not give industry codes but short 
description of sectors which have been coded to Nace 3-digits. Based on this sector infor-
mation, we construct industry level measures of competition. For the degree of price competi-
tion we use an industry's price cost margin (PCM) since it gives an indication whether firms 
are able to achieve margins high above their marginal costs. For the sake of interpretation, we 
transform the variable to 1–PCM, i.e. values close to zero indicate low price competition in 
the buyer market and values close to one refer to very intense price competition. As an indica-
tor of technological competition we use a sector’s R&D intensity (RDint: R&D expenditure 
over sales) since firms will dedicate a higher share of their resources to R&D if keeping pace 
with technological change is crucial for competing in their market. 
We do not have information on the location of the largest buyers which implies that we do not 
know whether they are domestic or international buyers, but we do know the firms’ export 
share in total sales. We calculate both 1–PCM and R&D intensity for Germany and for OECD 
countries, to capture the intensity of competition on domestic and foreign markets. We weight 
the values with the respective share of a supplier’s domestic and international sales.10 In addi-
tion, we also introduce dummy variables indicating the position of the buyer industry in the 
value chain. We distinguish between the production of raw materials, intermediaries, capital 
goods, consumer goods, producer services and consumer services.11 
3.2.4. Competitive environment of the supplier 
A supplier’s incentive to invest in innovation activities may be shaped by the competitive 
environment in their own market as well. Therefore, we control for concentration in the sup-
plier's market since a monopoly or oligopoly may allow for higher margins and thus for high-
er investments in R&D or conversely for lower incentives to invest in R&D.12 Concentration 
in the supplier's market is measured by two dummy variables capturing the number of main 
competitors. The first dummy takes the value one if the firm responded to have no competi-
tors and zero otherwise. The second dummy takes the value one if the firm indicated to have 
at most 5 main competitors and zero otherwise. 
What is more, there are firm characteristics which alleviate the influence of powerful buyers 
and strengthen a supplier’s bargaining position. On one hand, compared to a single-product-
supplier, a high degree of product diversification offers more outside options to the supplier 
and allows to escaping from profit squeeze as described above. Hence we include the degree 
of product diversification of a supplier, measured as the share of sales which is not generated 
                                                 
9 Nace is the industrial classification system used in European Union statistics. This study uses Nace rev. 1.2. 
10 For a detailed description of buyer market competition measures see Appendix B. 
11 The definition of these industry groups can be found in Table C1 in the Appendix. 
12 For an overview of the extensive literature dealing with the effects of market structure on innovation see e.g. 
Cohen (2010). 
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by a supplier’s main product line.13 On the other hand, suppliers may be very active in ex-
panding their marketing activities. The extension of marketing activities can attract new cus-
tomers and hence increase the number of the supplier's outside options. We control for this by 
a dummy variable indicating whether the supplier has introduced a new design or new meth-
ods for selling products in the past three years. 
3.2.5. Further control variables 
Following the literature on firms propensity to innovate (see e. g. Cohen, 1995; Crepon et al., 
1998), we also include firm size measured by the number of employees, firm age (in logs), a 
firm's ability to absorb knowledge measured by the share of graduated employees and wheth-
er a firm belongs to an enterprise group as explanatory variables. Moreover, we also control 
for a firm's sector affiliation and whether a firm is located in the territory of the former GDR. 
3.3. Estimation strategy 
Innovation incentives of suppliers are shaped by a supplier's bargaining position vis-à-vis its 
buyers and by the type of competition that characterises buyer markets. Accordingly, we 
model the innovation decision of a supplier to be dependent on a measure reflecting the rela-
tion between a supplier’s and a buyer’s bargaining position, the dimensions of competition in 
the buyer market as well as further determinants. Since we measure innovation incentives by 
R&D intensity, we have to take a possible selection bias into account as this variable is only 
observable for firms that engage in research and development activities. To control for this we 
apply the well-known generalised Tobit model (Heckman, 1979). 
This approach furthermore enables us to separate the effect of buyer power and buyer market 
competition on the supplier's probability to start R&D activities from the effect on the deci-
sion how much to invest in R&D once the supplier decided to start R&D. As many authors 
point out, when using a generalised Tobit model one needs to make sure to have an exclusion 
restriction which explains the selection but not the structural equation and is not correlated to 
the error term of the latter. We use firm size to be the exclusion restriction for two reasons. 
First, firm size will positively affect the probability to start R&D activities as larger firms 
have an advantage in spreading the fix costs of R&D over larger output (Cohen and Klepper, 
1996). At the same time firm size should not have an effect on R&D intensity as the latter is 
already by definition scaled by size. Second, related research frequently uses firm size as ex-
clusion restriction in this context (see e. g. Griffith et al., 2006). 
In the first stage we estimate the probability of a supplier to spend a positive amount on R&D 
activities in the next period which is followed in the second stage by the estimation of R&D 
intensity given the supplier started with R&D activities.14 Analogous to Crepon et al. (1998) 
we assume that firms take up R&D activities if discounted future profits from R&D activities 
are positive. Let RD*i,t+1 be the discounted future profits from R&D of supplier i in period 
                                                 
13 Note that the extent to which the largest three customers account for supplier's sales refers to the main line of 
product. 
14 We use the R&D activities in t+1 to avoid simultaneity problems, which may occur from the fact that R&D 
investments of a supplier can also have an effect on a supplier’s exposure to buyer power as well as a supplier’s 
market environment. 
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t+1. These expected profits are not observable and depend on the supplier’s bargaining posi-
tion relative to those of the buyer, i.e. whether the supplying firm is subject to the exertion of 
buyer power (BP), and the intensity of competition in the buyer industry (BCk with k = 1, 2) 
reflecting the price and technological dimension of competition, respectively. The cross term 
accounts for possible interactions between a supplier’s exposure to buyer power and the type 
of competition in the downstream market and allows us to test our hypotheses. In addition we 
include a vector of variables reflecting a supplier's competitive environment (SC) which is 
likely to shape the innovation incentives of the supplier, too. Other relevant firm specific 
characteristics are captured by a vector of control variables (X). The unobserved error term is 
represented by ε. We observe that firms invest in R&D in t+1 if RD*i,t+1 is positive. 
Furthermore we assume the true R&D intensity RDint*i,t+1 of supplier i in period t+1 to be 
determined by a mostly identical set of explanatory variables, i. e. the supplier’s bargaining 
position relative to those of the buyer (BP), the intensity of competition in the buyer industry 
(BCk with k = 1, 2), the cross terms as well as a vector of variables reflecting a supplier's 
competitive environment (SC). Firm specific characteristics are captured by vector Y. 
We will estimate the following model with equation (1) denoting the selection equation and 
equation (2) denoting the intensity equation. 
 (1) 
  
 (2) 
  
Note that vector X is identical to vector Y with the exception of firm size, since we need to 
take the exclusion restriction into account. Due to the fact, that RDint*i,t+1 is only observable 
when RD*i,t+1 is positive, we assume joint normality of both disturbance terms εi,t and  µi,t. 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables of interest differentiated by a supplier’s 
exposure to buyer power. The descriptive analysis reveals some interesting differences which 
are robust across the two specifications of the buyer power variable. We find the share of 
R&D performing firms to be significantly lower in the subsamples of suppliers confronted 
with buyer power. In fact, the share decreases in the degree of buyer power. Contrastingly, we 
observe no significant differences in the means of R&D intensity. 
Considering the competition variables in the most important buyer’s industry, we find no sig-
nificant differences between the total sample and the various subsamples. Hence, there is no 
indication for powerful buyers to have more intensive competition may it be in terms of prices 
or R&D. We observe a higher share of dependent suppliers to be monopolists when we apply 
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the widest definition of buyer power B1.15 In addition, suppliers being exposed to buyer pow-
er are less diversified in their product range, have less employees, show less continuous R&D 
activities, are younger and a significantly higher share of them is located in the former East 
Germany. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics differentiated by a supplier’s exposure to buyer power 
                                           
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
 All  BP1=1  BP2=1 
RDt+1a  0.493  0.500  0.423 *** 0.495  0.404 *** 0.492 
RDintt+1a  0.031  0.092  0.028  0.079  0.021 * 0.057 
Buyer's 1-PCMtb  0.639  0.128  0.640  0.126  0.630  0.133 
Buyer's RDinttb  0.402  1.135  0.448  1.251  0.375  1.094 
No. of competitors: Noneta  0.038  0.191  0.055 ** 0.227  0.004 *** 0.060 
No. of competitors: 1-5ta  0.571  0.495  0.579  0.494  0.484 *** 0.501 
Product diversityt  0.282  0.241  0.217 *** 0.214  0.211 *** 0.215 
Marketingta  0.240  0.427  0.179 *** 0.384  0.207  0.406 
No. of employees (ln)t  3.844  1.598  3.518 *** 1.427  3.523 *** 1.481 
Share of graduated employeest  0.198  0.235  0.213  0.259  0.207  0.260 
Continuous R&D activities  0.326  0.469  0.275 *** 0.447  0.240 *** 0.428 
Firm age (ln)  2.535  0.868  2.394 *** 0.825  2.378 *** 0.834 
Part of enterprise groupta  0.566  0.496  0.548  0.498  0.556  0.498 
East Germanyta  0.367  0.482  0.442 *** 0.497  0.440 *** 0.497 
N                                            1,129   385   275 
Results are derived from Two-sample t tests comparing sample means of dependent and independent suppliers. Asterisks indicate the level of 
significance that the differences of sample means are not equal 0: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The descriptive statistics of the remain-
ing variables is shown in Table C2 in the Appendix. 
 a Dummy variable 
b For details on the calculation see in the Appendix B. 
4.2. Regression results 
Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients using first a specification without the interaction 
terms. The columns 1 and 3 show the estimated coefficients of the selection equation while 
columns 2 and 4 show the estimated coefficients of the intensity equation. With respect to our 
measures of a supplier’s exposure to buyer power we predominantly find effects on the deci-
sion how much to invest in R&D. Regardless of the measure for buyer power, the estimated 
coefficients show a significantly negative sign in the intensity equations with the levels of 
significance increasing the narrower our definition of buyer power. The magnitude of the co-
efficient is higher in the estimation using BP2, indicating that the effect is stronger the more 
accurate buyer power is measured. For the selection equation, we find no significant coeffi-
cient for BP1 while BP2 is negative although it is only weakly significant. 
Regarding the dimensions of competition in the most important buyer’s market – no matter 
whether this buyer has a stronger bargaining position than the supplier – we find no evidence 
that price competition is correlated to the probability of a supplier to start R&D activities 
when applying BP1. For BP2 however there is a weakly significant negative correlation, i. e. 
the stronger price competition in the downstream market, the lower a supplier’s probability to 
                                                 
15 Note that the definition of BP2 requires the suppliers has to have more than 5 competitors or a high degree of 
substitutability. We thus refrain from interpreting the descriptive statistics on the number of competitors and 
show them for the sake of completeness. 
13 
start R&D activities. Across both model specifications we find no evidence that downstream 
price competition affects the R&D intensity of suppliers. Regarding R&D competition in the 
downstream market, we find weakly significant coefficients in the selection equation while 
the coefficient estimates are insignificant for the intensity equation across both model specifi-
cations. Hence, downstream R&D competition intensity positively affects the decision to start 
R&D while it has no consequences for a supplier’s decision how much to invest. 
Table 3: Estimated coefficients of the Generalised Tobit model without interaction terms 
                                             RDi,t+1 RDinti,t+1   RDi,t+1 RDinti,t+1 
   1 2  3 4 
BP1ta  -0.166     -0.025 **         
  (0.104)     (0.011)          
BP2ta       -0.191 *   -0.033 *** 
                                                 (0.112)     (0.012)     
Buyer's 1-PCMtb  -0.726     -0.031      -0.741 *   -0.033     
  (0.449)     (0.045)      (0.449)     (0.045)     
Buyer's RDinttb  0.097 *   0.006      0.099 *   0.006     
  (0.059)     (0.004)      (0.059)     (0.004)     
No. of competitors: Noneta  -0.471 *   0.072 **   -0.548 **  0.061 *   
  (0.275)     (0.036)      (0.276)     (0.036)     
No. of competitors: 1-5ta  0.007     0.002      -0.017     -0.002     
  (0.097)     (0.009)      (0.098)     (0.009)     
Product diversityt  0.147     -0.011      0.147     -0.011     
  (0.207)     (0.020)      (0.207)     (0.020)     
Marketingta  0.297 *** 0.016      0.305 *** 0.017     
  (0.114)     (0.011)      (0.114)     (0.011)     
No. of employees (ln)t  0.151 ***    0.152 ***   
  (0.037)        (0.037)       
Share of graduated employeest 1.024 *** 0.153 ***  1.040 *** 0.154 *** 
  (0.278)     (0.025)      (0.278)     (0.025)     
Continuous R&D activitiest  1.583 *** 0.073 ***  1.577 *** 0.077 *** 
  (0.125)     (0.027)      (0.125)     (0.026)     
Firm age (ln)  -0.063     -0.008      -0.064     -0.007     
  (0.057)     (0.005)      (0.057)     (0.005)     
Part of enterprise groupta  0.085     -0.024 **   0.084     -0.022 **  
  (0.099)     (0.010)      (0.099)     (0.010)     
East Germanyta  -0.048     0.008      -0.053     0.009     
  (0.103)     (0.010)      (0.103)     (0.010)     
Mills Lambda    0.050        0.057 *   
    (0.033)        (0.032)     
Constant  -1.120 *** -0.053      -1.098 *** -0.059     
  (0.387)     (0.058)      (0.388)     (0.058)     
N                                           1,129  1,129 
LR/Wald chi2                               224  225 
P-value                                    0.000   0.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations include 20 industry dummies and 5 dummies capturing the 
buyer’s position in the value chain. Estimation results can be found in Table C 3 in the Appendix. 
a Dummy variable 
b For details on the calculation see Appendix B. 
With respect to the further explanatory variables we find highly robust results irrespective of 
the applied measure of buyer power exposure. Suppliers holding a monopoly exhibit a lower 
likelihood to invest in R&D but once they decided to start R&D activities they invest more in 
R&D. In addition, we find significantly positive coefficients in the selection equation for larg-
er firms and for suppliers who introduced marketing instruments. For the share of graduated 
employees we find significantly positive coefficient estimates in both equations of the model, 
implying that higher absorptive capacity contributes positively to the likelihood of investing 
in R&D as well as to a higher R&D intensity. Similarly, performing continuous R&D activi-
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ties also positively affects both the likelihood of starting R&D as well as the R&D intensity. 
For a supplier being part of an enterprise group we find significantly negative coefficients in 
the intensity equation which indicates that R&D is optimized within the group and resources 
are allocated accordingly among subsidiaries. Mills lambda is significant in our estimations 
using BP2, which is an indication that controlling for selection is necessary in our dataset. 
Let us now consider the results of the estimations including the interaction terms which are 
presented in Table 4. Again, columns with odd numbers show the estimated coefficients of the 
selection equation while columns with even numbers show the estimated coefficients of the 
intensity equation. 
Table 4: Estimated coefficients of the Generalised Tobit model with interaction terms 
                                             RDi,t+1 RDinti,t+1   RDi,t+1 RDinti,t+1 
   5 6  7 8 
BP1ta  -1.460 *** -0.075              
  (0.547)     (0.060)          
BP2ta       -1.351 **  -0.104 *   
                                                 (0.568)     (0.063)     
Buyer's 1-PCMtb  -1.447 *** -0.058      -1.317 **  -0.062     
  (0.554)     (0.054)      (0.535)     (0.053)     
Buyer's RDinttb  0.075     0.011 **   0.108     0.008 *   
  (0.072)     (0.005)      (0.070)     (0.004)     
BPta x Buyer's 1-PCMtb  2.002 **  0.089      1.830 **  0.115     
  (0.862)     (0.090)      (0.891)     (0.095)     
BPta x Buyer's RDinttb  0.082     -0.012 *    -0.007     -0.007     
  (0.118)     (0.007)      (0.124)     (0.009)     
No. of competitors: Noneta  -0.517 *   0.073 **   -0.566 **  0.060 *   
  (0.278)     (0.036)      (0.277)     (0.036)     
No. of competitors: 1-5ta  -0.011     0.001      -0.032     -0.003     
  (0.098)     (0.009)      (0.098)     (0.009)     
Product diversityt  0.135     -0.014      0.124     -0.012     
  (0.208)     (0.019)      (0.208)     (0.020)     
Marketingta  0.299 *** 0.015      0.306 *** 0.017     
  (0.114)     (0.010)      (0.114)     (0.011)     
No. of employees (ln)t  0.155 ***    0.154 ***   
  (0.037)        (0.037)       
Share of graduated employeest 1.002 *** 0.151 ***  1.016 *** 0.153 *** 
  (0.280)     (0.025)      (0.280)     (0.025)     
Continuous R&D activities  1.593 *** 0.071 ***  1.595 *** 0.078 *** 
  (0.125)     (0.026)      (0.125)     (0.026)     
Firm age (ln)  -0.064     -0.007      -0.065     -0.007     
  (0.057)     (0.005)      (0.057)     (0.005)     
Part of enterprise groupta  0.089     -0.025 **   0.085     -0.022 **  
  (0.099)     (0.010)      (0.099)     (0.010)     
East Germanyta  -0.035     0.008      -0.051     0.009     
  (0.104)     (0.010)      (0.104)     (0.010)     
Mills Lambda    0.046        0.057 *   
    (0.032)        (0.032)     
Constant  -0.668     -0.031      -0.726 *   -0.040     
  (0.434)     (0.056)      (0.428)     (0.056)     
Wald-Test on joint significance   
of BP, BP x Buyer's 1-PCM and  
BP x Buyer's RDint 
 χ
2 (3)= 
7. 94**  
χ2 (3)= 
9. 97**   
χ2 (3)= 
7.37*  
χ2 (3)= 
8.27**  
N                                           1,129  1,129 
LR/Wald chi2                               231  226 
P-value                                    0.000   0.000 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations include 20 industry dummies and 5 dummies capturing the 
buyer’s position in the value chain. Estimation results can be found in Table C 4 in the Appendix. 
a Dummy variable 
b For details on the calculation see Appendix B. 
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Compared to Table 3, we now see significant effects of buyer power in both selection equa-
tions. Regardless of the measure, we find significantly negative coefficients of buyer power. 
The inclusion of the interaction terms disentangles countervailing effects of buyer power and 
the intensity of price competition in buyer markets. The estimated coefficients of the interac-
tion with price competition in the buyer market are significantly positive with the level of 
significance being stronger for BP1 though. Our findings imply that having a less powerful 
bargaining position than the most important buyer reduces the likelihood of a supplier to start 
R&D activities. This negative effect is mitigated, however, if the powerful buyer faces strong 
price competition. 
A similar effect in the selection equations is found for the effect of price competition in buyer 
markets. In contrast to the results of the baseline model, the inclusion of interaction terms 
yields strongly significant coefficient estimates in both selection equations. Hence, we find a 
negative correlation of price intensity in buyer markets with a supplier’s probability to start 
R&D which suggests that having buyers who operate in a highly competitive environment 
with respect to prices reduces a supplier’s likelihood to invest in R&D. Interestingly, if buyers 
have a stronger bargaining position compared to suppliers, this negative effect is mitigated. 
The estimated coefficients of buyer power, price competition in the buyer market and its in-
teractions are more significant in the selection equation which applies BP1. The reason for this 
is most likely that the lower number of observations in the group of BP2 in combination with 
additional two interaction terms regarding competition intensity in buyer markets increases 
the standard error and lowers the level of significance for estimated coefficients. Considering 
the effect of buyer market R&D competition we find neither a significant effect of the main 
term nor the interaction with buyer power. 
The significant results of the intensity equations regarding the main terms of buyer power are 
not robust to the inclusion of the interaction terms. While BP1 looses significance completely, 
the significance level of BP2 drops from 1 to 10 percent. The interaction effect with R&D 
competition intensity in the buyer market is significantly negative in the specification apply-
ing BP1  – although the level of significance is rather low – while it is insignificant for BP2. In 
addition, the inclusion of the interaction terms reveals leads to significantly positive coeffi-
cient estimates of buyer market R&D competition intensity which implies that the higher the 
R&D intensity in the buyer market, the higher the R&D intensity of a supplier. The results 
presented in column 6 suggest however, that this positive impact is countervailed if the sup-
plier is subject to the exertion of buyer power. We find no evidence of buyer market price 
competition intensity to affect the R&D intensity of suppliers, neither directly nor when inter-
acted with buyer power. Yet the results of the Wald test show that the Null-hypothesis of the 
coefficient estimates of buyer power and its interactions being zero, can be rejected at reason-
able levels of significance. 
The estimated coefficients of all other explanatory variables are robust to the inclusion of the 
interaction terms, i.e. they keep their sign and their significance in the selection as well as in 
the intensity equation. 
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5. Discussion 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between buyer power and innovation in-
centives of supplying firms while taking the type of competition in the buyer market, namely 
price and technology, into account. While theory provides mixed results about this relation-
ship, empirical studies typically find a negative correlation between buyer power and suppli-
ers' innovation incentives. However, most studies are limited to certain industries and apply 
measures of buyer power generated either on an industry level or by subjective assessments of 
suppliers. Moreover, they do not consider the type of buyer market competition and likely 
effects on suppliers' innovation incentives. We argue that both dimensions of competition 
increase suppliers' incentives to innovate in combination with buyer power. 
We benefit from a dataset that provides data on firms both from manufacturing and service 
sectors on a supplier's exposure to buyer power with respect to economic dependency from 
the largest three customers and the buyers’ opportunities to switch to competing suppliers. 
Using these measures our baseline model shows that – once a supplier decided to invest in 
R&D – buyer power negatively affects the intensity of R&D investments which is largely in 
line with the existing empirical evidence. For the narrower definition of buyer power we also 
find suppliers to be less likely to invest in R&D at all. 
When including interaction terms that relate buyer power to the type of competition in the 
buyer market, we find interesting differences. A countervailing effect appears for suppliers 
that face powerful buyers operating under strong price competition, i.e. having a powerful 
buyer lowers a supplier’s probability to start own R&D efforts but if this buyer competes in-
tensely in prices this negative effect is alleviated. This finding is in line with our first hypoth-
esis that buyer power will have a more positive effect on suppliers’ innovation incentives if 
price competition in the downstream market is high. Under this circumstance buyers apparent-
ly use their power to stimulate suppliers' product innovation activities which requires invest-
ments on the supplier’s side to make use of the buyer's innovation impulses. This in turn in-
creases innovation incentives on the supply side as the supplier's bargaining position relative 
to the buyer improves and allows a more favourable split of the joint profit.  
On the contrary, we find no evidence for a positive effect on suppliers’ innovation incentives 
if the powerful buyer operates under intense technology competition. Instead, we find a nega-
tive effect of technology competition in the downstream market in combination with buyer 
power on a supplier’s decision on how much to invest in R&D activities. This effect is not 
robust, however, to a variation in the measure of buyer power. Nevertheless, it contradicts our 
second hypothesis, which stated that buyer power will have a more positive effect on suppli-
ers’ R&D incentives the stronger downstream technological competition. Apparently, for 
firms supplying to highly competitive industries in terms of technology, it is a precondition to 
have R&D activities but at the same time further investments into the relationship with a 
powerful buyer are not beneficial since powerful buyers are able to extract a larger share of 
joint profits. 
For practitioners at least three implications can be derived. First, the dimensions of competi-
tion in the downstream market matter for the innovation incentives of suppliers. They affect 
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however different stages of a supplier’s innovation decision. While downstream price compe-
tition affects the decision whether R&D investments are carried out, the technology dimen-
sion of buyer market competition affects a supplier’s decision how much to invest in R&D. 
Second, buyer power in combination with strong downstream price competition does not nec-
essarily lead to less upstream innovation incentives. In fact, strong buyer market price compe-
tition may even spur innovation activities if it is transferred to suppliers by a powerful buyer. 
This should be kept in mind when assessing mergers regarding their upstream innovation ef-
fects. Third, buyer power primarily affects the supplier’s decision on conducting R&D or not 
rather than how much to invest. Hence policies aimed at fostering innovation in sectors where 
firms are likely to be confronted with buyer power have to take this into account and should 
be designed accordingly. 
6. Concluding remarks and further research 
We examined the effects of buyer power and buyer market competition on suppliers’ innova-
tion incentives based on a large sample of firms across many different industries and employ-
ing an objective measure of buyer power. Yet there are opportunities for improvements 
providing various avenues of future research. First, it would be worthwhile from an empirical 
point of view to extend the analysis on innovation outputs on the firm level. That may include 
the questions whether the presence of powerful buyers affects innovation success and whether 
such buyers promote particular types of innovation. Second, suppliers which are confronted 
with buyer power may choose specific ways to appropriate a sufficient share of innovation 
rents, patenting for instance. Hence, in such circumstances suppliers may exhibit a different 
patenting behaviour. Finally, longer time series data may be extremely helpful since there 
may be a substantial time lag between buyer power, the decision to invest into R&D, and both 
the corresponding innovation output as well as the use of protection methods for intellectual 
property. 
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Appendix A. Variable definition 
The variables listed below with the subscript t were constructed from the MIP wave 2005 
while the variables with the subscript t+1 are derived from the MIP wave 2006. 
Table A 1: Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
RDt+1 Dummy variable taking value 1, if firm reports to have R&D expenditure in 2005 and 
0 otherwise. 
RDintt+1 R&D expenditure in 2005 divided by sales in 2005. 
BP1t Dummy variable taking value 1, if firm reports to generate at least 50% of the sales in 
2004 with the largest 3 customers and 0 otherwise. 
BP2t Dummy variable taking value 1 if firm reports to generate at least 50% of the sales in 
2004 with the largest 3 customers and reports either to have more than 5 competitors 
or to have highly substitutable products. If one condition is not fulfilled the dummy 
takes the value 0. 
Buyer’s 1-PCMt 1 – PCM on 2-digit level (Nace Rev. 1.2) and 3-digit level for Nace 244.16 
Buyer’s RDintt Industry R&D intensity on 2-digit level (Nace Rev. 1.2) and 3-digit level for Nace 
244.14 
No. of competitors: 
Nonet 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if firm reports to have no competitors on the main 
product market in 2004. Otherwise the dummy takes the value 0. 
No. of competitors: 1-5t Dummy variable taking value 1 if firm reports to have 1 to 5 competitors on the main 
product market in 2004. Otherwise the dummy takes the value 0. 
Product diversityt 1 – share of sales in 2004  generated by the main product line. 
Marketingt Dummy variable taking the value 1, if firm introduced a new design or a new method 
for selling products during 2002-2004. Otherwise the dummy takes the value 0. 
No. of employees (ln) t Log of number of employees in 2004 (full time equivalents). 
Share of graduated 
employees  
Share of employees holding a university degree in 2004. 
Continuous R&D activi-
tiest 
Dummy variable taking the value 1, if firm reports to have continuous R&D activities 
during 2002-2004 and 0 otherwise. 
Firm age (ln) t Log of the number of years (in 2004) since the enterprise was founded. 
Part of enterprise groupt Dummy variable taking the value 1, if firm reports to be part of an enterprise group in 
2004 and 0 otherwise. 
East Germanyt Dummy variable taking the value 1, if firm are located on the former GDR territory or 
in West-Berlin in 2004 and 0 otherwise. 
 
                                                 
16 For further explanations see Appendix B. 
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Appendix B. Calculation of buyer market competition measures 
PCM and R&D intensity are calculated for domestic and international markets. For domestic 
industries both measures are calculated on 2-digit-level Nace rev. 1.2 (except for Nace 24, 
which is separated in 244 pharmaceuticals and other chemicals) using MIP data. The PCM is 
calculated as given in equation (4). sit represents sales, mit material costs and wit wages and 
salaries in industry i and year t. For German data we take the average over the time period 
from 2001 to 2004. 
 
(4) 
  
The calculation of domestic R&D intensity is carried out as shown in equation (5) with RDit 
denoting R&D expenditure of industry i in year t. Taking the average over the years 2001 to 
2004 yields RDintiGER. 
 
(5) 
  
For customers in foreign countries we calculate the buyer market competition measures from 
OECD's Structural Analysis Database (STAN). We use information on the year 2003 from 19 
OECD countries which represent the vast majority of export markets of the Germany econo-
my: USA, France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Korea, 
Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Ireland, Poland, Czech Republic and 
Hungary. The PCM on Nace 2 industry level (with the exception of Nace 244) is calculated as 
shown in equation (6). gocit denotes gross output while iicit and lcompcit account for expendi-
ture on intermediate inputs and labour compensation of employees, respectively. The values 
refer to industry i in year t and country c. 
 
(6) 
  
Data on the R&D intensity of buyers in international markets is taken from OECD’s Analyti-
cal Business Enterprise Research and Development (ANBERD) data base and linked to 
STAN. The year 2003 is used as reference year. 
 
(7) 
  
The calculation of the R&D intensity for international markets is carried out as shown in 
equation (6). RDci represents the R&D expenditure in country c and industry i in the reference 
year. 
Finally, the international values are weighted with firm i’s export share of sales while the do-
mestic values of PCM and RDint are weighted with firm i's share of domestic sales. The sum 
of both parts yields the variables used for the estimations. 
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Appendix C. Additional tables 
Table C 1: Industry breakdown of suppliers’ largest customers 
Industry group of largest 
buyer 
Nace code (Nace rev. 1.2) 
Raw materials 10-11, 13-14, 17.1, 21.1, 23.2-23.3, 24.1, 26.5, 27.1, 37.1-37.2, 40-41 
Industry intermediates 15.7, 17.2, 17.5-17.6, 18.3, 19.1, 20.1-20.4, 21.2, 22.2, 24.2-24.7, 25.1-25.2, 26.1-26.4, 26.6-
26.8, 27.2-27.5, 28.4-28.7, 31.2-31.6, 32.1, 34.3 
Capital goods 28.1-28.3, 29-30, 31.0-31.1, 32.2, 33, 34.1-34.2, 35.1-35.3 
Consumer goods 15.1-15.6, 15.8-15.9, 16.0, 17.3-17.4, 17.7, 18.1-18.2, 19.2-19.3, 20.5, 22.1, 22.3, 24.4-24.5, 
29.7, 31.5, 32.3, 33.5, 35.4-35.5, 36.1-36.6 
Enterprise services 45, 51, 60.2-60.3, 61.1-61.2, 62.2-62.3, 63.1-63.2, 63.4, 64.1, 65.1-65.2, 66, 67.1, 71.2-71.3, 
72.1-72.4, 72.6, 73.1-73.2, 74.1-74.8, 90, 92.1, 92.4 
Consumer services 45.4, 50, 52, 55, 60.1, 62.1, 63.3, 64.2-64.3, 67.2, 70.1-70.3, 71.1, 71.4, 72.5, 80.4, 92.2-92.3, 
92.6-92.7, 93 
 
Table C2: Descriptive statistics differentiated by a supplier’s exposure to buyer power (Contin-
ued from Table 2) 
                                           
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
 All    BP1=1    BP2=1   
Foodta  0.027  0.161  0.023  0.151  0.029  0.168 
Textilesta  0.033  0.178  0.034  0.181  0.025  0.158 
Wood/Paper/Printingta  0.036  0.187  0.018 ** 0.134  0.018 * 0.134 
Chemicalsta  0.049  0.215  0.044  0.206  0.055  0.228 
Syntheticsta  0.050  0.219  0.062  0.242  0.073 * 0.260 
Glass/Ceramicsta  0.021  0.144  0.008 ** 0.088  0.007 * 0.085 
Metalta  0.103  0.304  0.112  0.315  0.109  0.312 
Machineryta  0.081  0.272  0.065  0.247  0.062  0.241 
Electronicsta  0.125  0.331  0.138  0.345  0.120  0.326 
Automotiveta  0.024  0.153  0.047 *** 0.211  0.047 *** 0.213 
Furniture/Sports/Toysta  0.021  0.144  0.013  0.113  0.015  0.120 
Water supplyta  0.028  0.166  0.034  0.181  0.022  0.146 
Energy/Miningta  0.050  0.219  0.057  0.232  0.047  0.213 
Wholesaleta  0.035  0.185  0.018 ** 0.134  0.022  0.146 
Transportationta  0.066  0.248  0.096 *** 0.295  0.098 ** 0.298 
Media servicesta  0.036  0.187  0.016 *** 0.124  0.022  0.146 
Computer/Telecommunicationta  0.037  0.189  0.055 ** 0.227  0.058 ** 0.235 
Financial servicesta  0.015  0.122  0.003 ** 0.051  0.004 * 0.060 
Consultingta  0.029  0.169  0.016 * 0.124  0.011 ** 0.104 
Technical servicesta  0.062  0.241  0.081 * 0.272  0.076  0.266 
Enterprise servicesta  0.040  0.196  0.042  0.200  0.051  0.220 
Buyer: Raw materialsta  0.110  0.313  0.158 *** 0.366  0.156 *** 0.364 
Buyer: Industry intermediatesta  0.161  0.368  0.132 * 0.339  0.116 ** 0.321 
Buyer: Capital goodsta  0.292  0.455  0.353 *** 0.479  0.338 * 0.474 
Buyer: Consumer goodsta  0.110  0.313  0.096  0.295  0.109  0.312 
Buyer: Enterprise servicesta  0.177  0.382  0.156  0.363  0.167  0.374 
Buyer: Consumer servicesta  0.150  0.357  0.104 *** 0.306  0.113 * 0.317 
N                                            1,129   385   275 
Results are derived from Two-sample t tests comparing sample means of dependent and independent suppliers. Asterisks indicate the level of 
significance that the differences of sample means are not equal 0: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 a Dummy variable 
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Table C 3: Estimated coefficients of the Generalised Tobit model without interaction terms 
(Continued from Table 3) 
                                             RDi,t+1 RDinti,t+1   RDi,t+1 RDinti,t+1 
   1 2  3 4 
Textilesta  0.444     0.035      0.421     0.034     
  (0.299)     (0.035)      (0.298)     (0.035)     
Wood/Paper/Printingta  -0.028     -0.010      -0.037     -0.014     
                                            (0.306)     (0.034)      (0.306)     (0.035)     
Chemicalsta  0.675 **  0.081 ***  0.678 **  0.081 *** 
                                            (0.306)     (0.030)      (0.306)     (0.030)     
Syntheticsta  0.224     0.021      0.222     0.020     
                                            (0.279)     (0.031)      (0.279)     (0.031)     
Glass/Ceramicsta  0.007     0.024      0.005     0.020     
                                            (0.371)     (0.039)      (0.372)     (0.039)     
Metalta  0.103     0.009      0.092     0.005     
                                            (0.246)     (0.030)      (0.246)     (0.030)     
Machineryta  0.552 **  0.018      0.547 **  0.017     
                                            (0.277)     (0.030)      (0.277)     (0.030)     
Electronicsta  0.504 **  0.042      0.497 *   0.040     
                                            (0.256)     (0.029)      (0.256)     (0.029)     
Automotiveta  -0.098     0.035      -0.112     0.031     
                                            (0.380)     (0.039)      (0.380)     (0.039)     
Furniture/Sports/Toysta  0.977 *** 0.023      0.981 *** 0.024     
                                            (0.370)     (0.038)      (0.370)     (0.038)     
Water supplyta  0.274     0.040      0.253     0.034     
                                            (0.314)     (0.040)      (0.314)     (0.040)     
Energy/Miningta  -0.190     -0.002      -0.193     -0.003     
                                            (0.294)     (0.035)      (0.293)     (0.035)     
Wholesaleta  -0.117     -0.014      -0.117     -0.018     
                                            (0.313)     (0.044)      (0.313)     (0.043)     
Transportationta  -0.490 *   -0.022      -0.506 *   -0.031     
                                            (0.281)     (0.044)      (0.281)     (0.043)     
Media servicesta  -0.124     -0.022      -0.123     -0.024     
                                            (0.301)     (0.036)      (0.301)     (0.036)     
Computer/Telecommunicationta  0.340     0.037      0.330     0.036     
                                            (0.361)     (0.033)      (0.361)     (0.033)     
Financial servicesta  0.326     0.014      0.323     0.014     
                                            (0.386)     (0.046)      (0.386)     (0.046)     
Consultingta  -0.269     0.018      -0.279     0.015     
                                            (0.335)     (0.044)      (0.335)     (0.044)     
Technical servicesta  -0.193     0.114 ***  -0.208     0.111 *** 
                                            (0.297)     (0.032)      (0.297)     (0.032)     
Enterprise servicesta  -0.650 **  -0.017      -0.652 **  -0.022     
                                            (0.319)     (0.050)      (0.319)     (0.050)     
Buyer's industry: Raw materialsta  0.252     0.003      0.245     0.005     
                                            (0.198)     (0.022)      (0.197)     (0.022)     
Buyer's industry: Industry intermediatesta  0.403 **  0.044 **   0.396 **  0.045 **  
                                            (0.178)     (0.020)      (0.178)     (0.020)     
Buyer's industry: Capital goodsta  0.435 *** 0.035 *    0.428 **  0.037 **  
                                            (0.168)     (0.019)      (0.168)     (0.019)     
Buyer's industry: Consumer goodsta  0.287     0.054 **   0.288     0.056 *** 
                                            (0.197)     (0.021)      (0.197)     (0.021)     
Buyer's industry: Enterprise servicesta  0.257     0.014      0.259     0.017     
  (0.175)     (0.020)      (0.175)     (0.020)     
N                                           1,129  1,129 
LR/Wald chi2                                224  225 
P-value                                      0.000   0.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
a Dummy variable 
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Table C 4: Estimated coefficients of the Generalized Tobit model with interaction terms (Con-
tinued from Table 4) 
                                             RDi,t+1 RDinti,t+1   RDi,t+1 RDinti,t+1 
   5 6  7 8 
Textilesta  0.472     0.035      0.418     0.035     
  (0.302)     (0.035)      (0.300)     (0.035)     
Wood/Paper/Printingta  0.003     -0.008      -0.016     -0.013     
                                            (0.307)     (0.034)      (0.307)     (0.035)     
Chemicalsta  0.750 **  0.082 ***  0.721 **  0.084 *** 
                                            (0.309)     (0.030)      (0.308)     (0.030)     
Syntheticsta  0.232     0.019      0.227     0.020     
                                            (0.281)     (0.031)      (0.281)     (0.031)     
Glass/Ceramicsta  0.002     0.023      0.001     0.020     
                                            (0.371)     (0.039)      (0.372)     (0.039)     
Metalta  0.128     0.008      0.106     0.006     
                                            (0.247)     (0.029)      (0.247)     (0.030)     
Machineryta  0.591 **  0.016      0.572 **  0.019     
                                            (0.278)     (0.030)      (0.278)     (0.030)     
Electronicsta  0.531 **  0.039      0.512 **  0.041     
                                            (0.258)     (0.028)      (0.257)     (0.029)     
Automotiveta  -0.136     0.032      -0.123     0.031     
                                            (0.381)     (0.039)      (0.380)     (0.039)     
Furniture/Sports/Toysta  1.017 *** 0.024      1.009 *** 0.027     
                                            (0.373)     (0.038)      (0.372)     (0.038)     
Water supplyta  0.308     0.039      0.238     0.033     
                                            (0.316)     (0.040)      (0.316)     (0.040)     
Energy/Miningta  -0.168     -0.001      -0.185     -0.001     
                                            (0.294)     (0.035)      (0.293)     (0.035)     
Wholesaleta  -0.126     -0.012      -0.126     -0.018     
                                            (0.317)     (0.043)      (0.316)     (0.043)     
Transportationta  -0.452     -0.019      -0.477 *   -0.029     
                                            (0.284)     (0.043)      (0.283)     (0.044)     
Media servicesta  -0.138     -0.021      -0.136     -0.025     
                                            (0.303)     (0.036)      (0.303)     (0.036)     
Computer/Telecommunicationta  0.346     0.036      0.328     0.036     
                                            (0.363)     (0.033)      (0.362)     (0.033)     
Financial servicesta  0.273     0.011      0.279     0.011     
                                            (0.389)     (0.046)      (0.389)     (0.046)     
Consultingta  -0.306     0.017      -0.313     0.012     
                                            (0.339)     (0.044)      (0.338)     (0.044)     
Technical servicesta  -0.168     0.113 ***  -0.186     0.111 *** 
                                            (0.299)     (0.032)      (0.298)     (0.032)     
Enterprise servicesta  -0.659 **  -0.015      -0.663 **  -0.021     
                                            (0.320)     (0.050)      (0.319)     (0.050)     
Buyer's industry: Raw materialsta  0.242     0.003      0.252     0.005     
                                            (0.199)     (0.022)      (0.198)     (0.022)     
Buyer's industry: Industry intermediatesta  0.395 **  0.042 **   0.398 **  0.044 **  
                                            (0.179)     (0.020)      (0.179)     (0.020)     
Buyer's industry: Capital goodsta  0.418 **  0.034 *    0.416 **  0.036 *   
                                            (0.170)     (0.019)      (0.169)     (0.019)     
Buyer's industry: Consumer goodsta  0.237     0.051 **   0.260     0.055 *** 
                                            (0.199)     (0.021)      (0.198)     (0.021)     
Buyer's industry: Enterprise servicesta  0.220     0.013      0.232     0.015     
  (0.177)     (0.020)      (0.176)     (0.020)     
N                                           1,129  1,129 
LR/Wald chi2                                231  226 
P-value                                      0.000   0.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
a Dummy variable 
